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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, A 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
HAROLD BECKSTEAD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 92-0086-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1990), confers 
jurisdiction upon this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Should this Court correct the trial court's error of 
denying Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss on the grounds of 
pretext stop? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The trial court's findings of fact are entitled to deference 
and are to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah App. 1989). 
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This Court should accord the trial court no deference and 
review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness* 
State v. Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (1992) (citing State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Palmer, 803 
P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1991)) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This brief adopts and concurs in appellant's statement of 
the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Officer Wasden was the only witness testifying at the Jury 
Trial of Mr. Beckstead. Officer Wasden's testimony is included 
in the transcript ("T") that is prepared and attached to the 
appellant brief as Appendix 2. At 11:30 p.m., Officer Wasden 
noticed Mr. Beckstead driving south down State Street and through 
the 300 South intersection. (T. 11). Mr. Beckstead was driving 
in the far right line which was very wide because it incorporated 
the metered parking spaces and the bus stops. (T. 12-13). 
Because it was 11:30 p.m., there were no cars parked in the 
metered parking spaces or the bus stops in the far right lane. 
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(T. 12). Mr. Beckstead followed the curb line instead of the 
left hand side of the lane when he drove down State Street. (T. 
12). Because the curb cuts out into the lane to distinguish bus 
stops and parking spaces, Mr. Beckstead sometimes wove to his 
left to avoid the curb. (T. 12). Mr. Beckstead wove only a 
couple of feet to avoid the curb and always stayed within his own 
lane. (T. 13). Officer Wasden testified that he would not issue 
a violation for Mr. Beckstead's type of weaving. (T. 13). 
However, Officer Wasden suspected that Mr. Beckstead might be 
intoxicated. (T. 13). Officer Wasden stopped Mr. Beckstead, 
even though Mr. Beckstead did not violate any traffic laws. (T. 
13) . Mr. Beckstead immediately pulled over and cooperated with 
Officer Wasden. (T. 14). Officer Wasden did not notice anything 
exceptional about Mr. Beckstead's actions or behavior. (T. 14). 
While Officer Wasden talked to Mr. Beckstead, he thought that Mr. 
Beckstead's speech was not a normal speech pattern—clear but 
slightly slurred. (T. 17) Officer Wasden also smelled alcohol. 
(T. ) . On the basis of the smell of alcohol, Officer Wasden 
conducted a sobriety test and arrested Mr. Beckstead for driving 
while under the influence of alcohol. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should grant Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss on 
the grounds of pretext stop. Even though factual findings must 
be reviewed as clearly erroneous, the trial court's legal con-
clusion to deny Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss is a reviewable 
under a correction of error standard. Because Mr. Beckstead 
never violated a traffic law, Officer Wasden's stop was a pretext 
stop. The trial court was clearly erroneous to find that Officer 
Wasden's suspicion that Mr. Beckstead was driving under the 
influence of alcohol was a reasonable suspicion of a traffic 
offense. Even if this Court finds that the trial court was not 
clearly erroneous, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
denial of Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss. The trial court 
failed to apply the reasonable officer test. Because a reasonab-
le officer would not have stopped Mr. Beckstead, Officer Wasden's 
stop was a pretext stop. Therefore, this Court should either 
grant Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss on the grounds of pretext 
stop or remand to the trial court for further factual determina-
tions. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OP MR. 
BECKSTEAD'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL ON GROUNDS OF PRETEXT STOP 
This Court should reverse the trial court and grant Mr. 
Beckstead's motion to dismiss. The trial court neither followed 
nor applied the pretext stop framework this Court clearly laid 
out in Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45, 46. In Lopez, the of-
ficer suspected that the defendant did not have a valid driver's 
license. The officer stopped the defendant because of turning 
without signaling. The defendant failed to produce a driver's 
license and was arrested. The trial court ruled that the of-
ficer's stop was a pretext stop. Because there was an actual 
traffic violation, this Court reversed the trial court and ruled 
that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a valid stop of the 
defendant. Id. at 46. In deciding Lopez, this Court laid out 
the following pretext stop framework: 
A* If there was no traffic violation or reasonable 
suspicion that one occurred, then the stop was a 
pretext stop. 
B. The state must establish that a traffic violation 
occurred in the officer's presence or that the officer 
had probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to believe 
that a traffic violation had occurred. 
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C. If the officer had a reasonable suspicion to believe 
that a traffic violation occurred, then the defendant 
must submit evidence that the stop was a pretext stop. 
D. Once the defendant submits evidence of the pretext 
stop, the state must show that a reasonable officer 
would have made the stop absent the alleged illegal 
motivation. 
Id. at 45, 46 (citing State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 979-80 (Utah 
1988); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 
1986); New Mexico v. Mann, 712 P.2d 6, 10 (NM.App. 1985) cert. 
denied, 713 P.2d 556 (1986)). The City's argument and the trial 
court's ruling fail to properly apply the above framework. The 
following analysis will examine each step of the pretext stop 
framework to the facts of Mr. Beckstead's case. 
A. Because Mr. Beckstead Did Not Commit Any Traffic 
Violation, Officer Wasden's Stop of Mr. Beckstead Was a 
Pretext Stop 
As presented in Mr. Beckstead's appellant brief, Officer 
Wasden's stop of Mr. Beckstead was a pretext stop because Mr. 
Beckstead did not violate any traffic law. When an officer stops 
a vehicle that has not violated any traffic law, the stop is 
unconstitutional. Id., at 43. According to Officer Wasden, he 
did not notice Mr. Beckstead violate any traffic violation and 
did not stop him for any traffic violation. (T. 13). 
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B. Officer Wasden#s Stop of Mr. Beckstead on The Mere 
Suspicion of a Traffic Violation is Unconstitutional 
And Against Public Policy 
The trial court was clearly in error when it ruled that 
Officer Wasden had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Beckstead was 
driving under the influence of alcohol. Because the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that reasonable suspicion is a finding of fact, 
this court should reverse only if the trial court is clearly 
erroneous. See e.g., State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 137 n.l 
(Utah 1991). In State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987), 
the Utah Supreme Court explained Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a) which established the clearly erroneous standard for find-
ings of fact. The Supreme Court relied on the following federal 
standard to define "clearly erroneous:" 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed. 
Id. at 193 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 333 
U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). When the City explained the clearly 
erroneous standard in their brief, it paraphrased Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971). The 
Supreme Court used Wright & Miller as dictum to clarify the 
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actual federal standard. We urge this Court to recognize and 
apply the proper definition of the clearly erroneous standard of 
review as expressed in Gypsum. 
The trial court was clearly erroneous when it found that 
Officer Wasden reasonably suspected that Mr. Beckstead was 
driving under the influence of alcohol. Permitting police to 
stop citizens because of driving idiosyncrasies is 
unconstitutional and against public policy. In Lopez, this court 
stated that 
allowing police officers to stop vehicles for any minor 
violation when the officer is pursuing a hunch would 
allow officers to seize almost any individual on the 
basis of otherwise unconstitutional objectives. 
Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43. Mr. Beckstead did not even 
commit a minor driving violation. Officer Wasden stopped him for 
a minor driving idiosyncrasy. Because minor traffic offenses and 
inconsistent driving patterns are prevalent in society, police 
can follow their hunches or suspicions and randomly pull over 
cars in hope of finding further evidence that the driver may be 
intoxicated. Finding Officer Wasden's suspicion as reasonable 
would give police unbridled discretion and authority to stop 
drivers. This Court should rule that the trial court was clearly 
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erroneous and that Officer Wasden's suspicion was unreasonable. 
C, Mr, Beckstead Brought Forth Evidence to Support That 
Officer Wasden ' s Stop Was a Pretext Stop. 
Mr. Beckstead introduced evidence to support that Officer 
Wasden's stop was a pretext stop. Even though Mr, Beckstead did 
n o t v i 0 i a t e any traffic offense, officer Wasden suspected that 
Mr. Beckstead was driving wiii ] e intoxicated. Despite Officer 
Wasden's suspicions, he had no evidence that Mr. Beckstead had 
been drinking,. Once Officer Wasden stopped Mr. Beckstead, 1 le 
searched for a rear;. i--> justify his suspicion that Mr. Beckstead 
was :i ntoxicated , -JZ Wasden i : ecogi :i :i zed tl: lat 1 li: Beckstead 
had an irregular speech pattern and smelled alcohol On the 
basi s of the sr : i = ] ] : f a] col 10] Officer Wasdei 1 < :ondi icted a 
sobriety test and arrested Mr. Beckstead for driving while 
I 111. (»,X J i i , l ( f i l , III UL>i:WM10i, n l H c ' f ' l W d S d e i ) I l l U p p e U I I I t l 8 C k s t l ;!(i I I I U 
hopes of tinding evidence to support his hunch that Mr. Beckstead 
Becai ise Mr. 
Beckstead's produced evidence that Officer Wasden stopped him as 
a prete: :t EJtO}:: • t : > f:ii :i id ev :i de i:ic: e <: »f ai i offense, 1 Ir Beckstead 
fulfilled, his burden of proof. 
D. The Trial Court Improperly Denied Mr. Beckstead's 
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Motion To Dismiss On Grounds of Pretext Stop Because 
The City Never Presented Evidence That a Reasonable 
Officer Would Stop Mr. Beckstead Under Similar 
Circumstances 
This Court should reverse the trial court and grant Mr. 
Beckstead7s motion to dismiss on grounds of pretext stop. The 
trial court improperly dismissed Mr. Beckstead's motion to 
dismiss on grounds of a pretext stop because the court never 
ruled on whether a reasonable officer would have stopped Mr. 
Beckstead. The proper test to determine whether a stop was a 
pretext stop is the objective test of whether a reasonable 
officer under the same circumstances would have stopped the 
defendant. Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44. In denying Mr. 
Beckstead's motion to dismiss the trial court stated that 
Now, I, do not believe normal driving patterns would include 
following that curb line through a bus stop and other 
parking areas. It seems to me that the normal, prudent way 
of driving that street was to stay on the left-hand side 
where the lane is and drive straight down. (emphasis added) 
(T. 15). 
The trial court never applied the objective reasonable officer 
test. Instead, the court relied on its own subjective opinion as 
to whether Officer Wasden's stop was a pretext stop. Because the 
trial court never addressed whether a reasonable officer would 
have stopped Mr. Beckstead, the trial court improperly applied 
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the pretext stop framework and improperly denied Mr. Beckstead's 
motion to dismiss. 
This Court should apply the Correction of Error standard to 
review the trial court's legal conclusion that Officer Wasden's 
stop of Mr. Beckstead was not a pretext stop. The trial court's 
denial of Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss on grounds of a 
pretext stop was a legal conclusion. See Lopez, 181 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 42. Because Officer Wasden's testimony is the only set 
of facts in the case, there are no factual issues left to be 
decided by the trial court. This Court should show no deference 
to the trial court and apply a de novo review of Mr. Beckstead's 
motion to dismiss on grounds of pretext stop. 
This Court should reverse the trial court and grant Mr. 
Beckstead's motion to dismiss on grounds of pretext stop. The 
issue of whether a traffic stop is a pretext stop must turn on 
the objective question of whether a reasonable officer would have 
made the stop under the same circumstances absent the illegal 
motivation. Id. at 44 (citing Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; Smith, 
799 F.2d at 740-11). This Court should consider Officer Wasden's 
testimony as to why he stopped Mr. Beckstead and whether such a 
stop is consistent with his usual practice. According to this 
11 
Court in Lopez, if the officer admits having never before stopped 
a driver for the offense, it tends to show a reasonable officer 
would not have made the stop. Id. at 45. Officer Wasden 
testified that he would not give Mr. Beckstead a violation for 
driving the way Mr. Beckstead drove. (T. 13). Because Officer 
Wasden would normally not stop and give Mr. Beckstead a 
violation, the stop was unreasonable. Because the stop was 
unreasonable, this Court should grant Mr. Beckstead's motion to 
dismiss. 
However, if this Court feels that further factual 
determinations are necessary about Officer Wasden's normal 
procedures and the procedures of other officers, this Court 
should reverse the trial court and remand for further factual 
determinations. Since Mr. Beckstead established sufficient 
evidence to support a pretext stop, the burden should shifted to 
the City to show that a reasonable officer would have made the 
stop absent the legal motivation. Id. at 46 (citing Mann, 712 
P.2d at 10). The ultimate burden of proof should be on the City 
to show that there was no pretext stop. The City has primary 
access to most of the relevant evidence including the officer's 
past stop practices and the practices of other officers. Id. at 
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47, 48, n.17 (citing Staheli v. Farmers/ Coop., 655 P.2d 680, 683 
(Utah 1982)(burden of proof lies with party most likely to have 
access to evidence)). Because the trial court never addressed 
whether a reasonable officer would have stopped Mr. Beckstead, 
this court should either grant Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss 
or remand the case for further factual determination. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should correct the trial court's error and grant 
Mr. Beckstead his motion to dismiss on grounds of pretext stop. 
Since Mr. Beckstead did not violate a traffic offense, Officer 
Wasden's stop was a pretext stop. Even if this Court concurs 
that Officer Wasden had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Beckstead 
committed a traffic offense, the trial court still did not follow 
the pretest stop framework. The trial court never ruled whether 
a reasonable officer would have stopped Mr. Beckstead. This 
Court should grant Mr. Beckstead's motion to dismiss because a 
reasonable officer would not normally stop Mr. Beckstead for his 
driving pattern. However, if this Court feels that additional 
facts are needed to determine whether a reasonable officer would 
have stopped Mr. Beckstead, this Court should reverse the trial 
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court and remand the case. On remand, since Mr. Beckstead 
introduced evidence about a pretext stop, the City has the burden 
of proof that the stop was not a pretext stop. 
Respectfully submitted this P/s day of ^^/Pkf , 1992 
LARRY^LONG 
Lawyer for Defendant//Appellant 
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